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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Robert Charles Elizarraraz appeals from the

district court’s

modify a n0 contact order and from the amended n0 contact

Statement

Of The

Facts

order regarding jurisdiction t0

order.

And Course Of The Proceedings

In February of 2011, police responded to a domestic disturbance involving Elizarraraz

and

his then-Wife,

Amber Nickelson

(née Elizarraraz).

(Sealed EX. pp.31-41.) Nickelson called

police after an “intense verbal ﬁght”; she reported that after she told Elizarraraz “that she wanted

a divorce,” he said “‘I will end this right now’ and charged towards her,” “in a rage,” at which
point she “ran to the bathroom and locked herself and [their] daughter” inside.

eventually “crept out 0f the bathroom and

Elizarraraz

(1d,,

conﬁrmed

had taken her phone, so Nickelson ran

to a

that

[Elizarraraz]

(1d,,

p.33.)

was gone.”

She
(Id.)

nearby salon, where she called police.

pp.31, 35.)

Nickelson told police about “a history” of Elizarraraz “physically abusing her,” that he

had previously “thrown her on the ground during an argument and strangled her,” and
feared that [Elizarraraz]

would come back and beat her up.”

(1d,,

p.33.)

that “she

Elizarraraz

was

eventually arrested for misdemeanor domestic assault and ordered t0 have n0 contact With

Nickelson.

(E

id.,

pp. 36, 44.)

Within a few months Elizarraraz was back together With Nickelson in Violation of the n0
contact order.

(Id.,

pp.42, 44.)

On May

16,

201

1,

ofﬁcers returned t0 the residence for a welfare

check, after ofﬁcers were “advised that Robert Elizarraraz had called a friend and advised

that

he stabbed himself, and he could see his intestines.”

(1d,,

p.44.)

them

Ofﬁcers spoke t0

Nickelson,

Who

said “that she and Robert

himself to get back
the incident at the

at her,”

which she

stated

had gotten
he did

into another ﬁght,

“all the time.”

(Id.)

She

and Robert stabbed
later testiﬁed

about

no contact order hearing:

I mean—well, there was one time we got into a ﬁght. And I was afraid 0f
And he was coming at me, and so I locked myself in the bathroom. And I
don’t know if that was a separate occasion or the same thing, because it all kind of

Yeah.
him.

seems

But

I

to blur together.

know I was

trying t0 get out of the house one time because

I

had previously

taken out the bathroom—the screen above the bathroom bathtub. That was part 0f

my, like, escape route. And I was heading across the bathtub, and he grabbed me
and pulled me across the tub. And then he sat 0n me and had a knife, and he
stabbed himself in the abdomen and was yelling and saying that, “Look What you
made me d0. This is what you made me d0.”

And

then Maddie was crying, and he picked her up.

because he was getting blood

me, and

at that point,

N0. Wait. N0.
(TL, p.33, L.23

I

didn’t leave.

He

over her.

And

I

talked

him

freaking out

into giving

Maddie

t0

house.

left in

a 4Runner.

— p.34, L20.)

Based on

this incident

guilty t0 felony Violation of a

afﬁrmed

all

we ﬂed the

And I remember

that conviction in

(and others) Elizarraraz was arrested and he ultimately pleaded

n0 contact

order.

(E Sealed EX., p.52.)

an unpublished opinion.

State V. Elizarraraz,

2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 593 (Idaho App. August
While Elizarraraz was

in prison

The Court of Appeals
Docket N0. 39477,

16, 2012).

he continued t0 try to contact Nickelson.

TL, p.16, L.22 — p.17, L.2 (No. 40905).) The

state

charged Elizarraraz with three

(E 2/7/131
new

counts 0f

felony Violation of a n0 contact order, this time alleging a persistent Violator enhancement.

1

The

(R.,

and clerk’s record from Elizarraraz’s prior appeal (No. 40495), from the same
underlying criminal conviction, were augmented into this record 0n appeal. (Limited R., p.2.)
“Limited R.” Will refer t0 the limited clerk’s record prepared for this appeal and “R.” Will refer t0
transcripts

the record prepared for appeal No. 40495.

pp.42-43; 67-68.)

Elizarraraz eventually pleaded guilty t0 one felony count and, per the plea

agreement, the state agreed to dismiss the remaining counts and withdraw the persistent Violator

enhancement.

(1d,,

The

p.73.)

sentenced Elizarraraz t0 ﬁve years, with four years

district court

ﬁxed, t0 run consecutively to his sentence in the prior case.
additionally entered a

Nickelson.

(1d,,

p.76.) That order

district court.

The

district court

no contact order 0n February 28, 2013, prohibiting any contact with

was

set to expire

0n February 27, 2018.

In January 0f 2018, Nickelson ﬁled a “Request t0

with the

(R., p.78.)2

(Sealed EX. pp.1-2.)

order “[c]hanged because”

“[i]t Will

(Id.)

Modify 0r Dismiss

N0

Contact Order”

Nickelson wrote that she wanted the no contact

expire in Feb, 2018.”

(Id., p.1.)

She therefore requested “an

extension” to the order, and also asked that their daughter be added to the order as a protected

party. (Id.,

p2.)

The court held a hearing 0n Nickelson’s request 0n February
Elizarraraz obj ected to extending the

NCO

8,

or adding their daughter to

2018. (Limited R., p.17.)

it.

(m

id.)

The

district

court set the matter for an evidentiary hearing in March, and, in the meantime, entered an

amended n0
2018

(the

contact order,

same day

as the

naming only Nickelson

upcoming

Elizarraraz subsequently

as a protected party, set t0 expire

0n March

9,

hearing). (Id.; Sealed EX., pp.3-4.)

moved

t0 vacate the evidentiary hearing, alleging that

the state “joined in the Victim’s motion to

modify the

burden t0 prove that the Court has jurisdiction

N0

Contact Order”

to hear this case,”

it

because

was “the

State’s

Which he purported the

state

2

Elizarraraz later ﬁled a Rule 35 motion requesting the district court reduce his sentence in light
0f his purported track record in prison and “in the interest 0f justice.” (R,. p.108 (emphasis

The district court denied the motion (id., pp.116-19), and the Court of Appeals
afﬁrmed the order denying the motion in a 2014 unpublished opinion. State V. Elizarraraz,
Docket No. 40495, 2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 3 15 (Idaho App. January 8, 2014).
a1tered).)

had not done. (Limited

R., p.20.)

Thereafter, the state ﬁled a

motion

n0 contact

t0 extend the

order and supporting exhibits under seal. (Sealed EX., pp.5-72.)

During the March
recalled

amend

it

the

was “concerned
no contact

2018 hearing, a jurisdictional issue came up; the

9,

as t0

order.

Whether or not

even had jurisdiction to grant” the motion

[it]

(Limited R., p.24;

district court later

Tr., p.4, Ls.17-23.)

The court continued

to

the

hearing t0 give the parties additional time t0 do research and brieﬁng “0n the jurisdiction issue.”

(m Limited R.,

p.24.)

The

district court

entered a

new amended n0

contact order, this time

expiring in April. (Sealed EX., pp.73-74.)

Elizarraraz ﬁled an Objection t0 Extension of a

34.)

He

N0

(Limited R., pp.31-

Contact Order.

argued that the court had n0 jurisdiction3 to extend the duration 0f a n0 contact order:

Idaho Criminal Rule 46.2 does provide for the court to take some additional action

on a criminal n0 contact

order, but this jurisdiction is limited.

This Rule only

provides for the court t0 either modify or terminate a criminal no contact order

while

it is

substance

of

modiﬁcation.
duration.

A plain

in effect—it does not provide authority to extend that order.

reading 0f I.C.R. 46.2 demonstrates that

The

expiration.

It

the

provides for the court to modify the

it

the scope 0f prohibited contacts—through
But the Rule only permits one action regarding its

order—i.e.

I.C.R. 46.2(b).

rule provides that the court

may

terminate the order prior to

its

does not permit the court t0 take the opposite step t0 extend the

order.

(Limited R., p.32 (emphasis in original).)

3

on appeal that the court’s and parties’ references t0 “jurisdiction” below are
more properly framed as a reference t0 the court’s legal authority to act, as opposed to its subject
Elizarraraz argues

matter jurisdiction to hear the state’s motion. (Appellant’s brief, p.9, n.5.)
is

What defense counsel below thought, insofar

district

as Elizarraraz’s

It is

unclear that this

motion expressly stated the

court “lacks subject matter jurisdiction to take the action requested

(Limited R., p.33 (emphasis added).)

by

the State.”

In any event, because Elizarraraz also speciﬁcally argued

below that “I.C.R. 46.2 does not provide authority”
argument—the only one he presses on appeal—was

to extend a

no contact

likely preserved.

(E

order, the no-authority
id.)

would

Elizarraraz argued that allowing extensions

also run afoul of State V. Castro, 145

Idaho 173, 177 P.3d 387 (2008), purporting that “there would truly be n0 real date of actual
termination of these orders—the State could simply continue t0 return to the court into perpetuity

seeking additional extensions 0f time regardless of

how

was.”

“should Ms. [Nickelson] want t0 seek an

pp.32-33.)

(Id.,

Finally,

he claimed

that,

far in the past the original conviction

additional order prohibiting contact with Mr. Elizarraraz,” a domestic Violence protection order

under “LC.

§

39-6304” was the better way

t0

do

so.

(Id.,

p.33.)

Prior to the evidentiary hearing, the district court issued

Modify

N0

Contact Order

&

under “the plain language 0f

modify a

NCO

at

Vacating Hearing.

[I.C. §

any time during

(1d,,

pp.35-39.)

its

Order Re: Jurisdiction

The

district court

its

The court speciﬁcally disagreed With
it

concluded,

18-920]” and Rule 46.2, “that a judge has the jurisdiction t0
existence, even after the court loses jurisdiction over the

criminal charges and/or conviction that led to [the] creation of the n0 contact order.”

order did not allow

to

Elizarraraz’s claim that the court’s ability to

(Id.,

p.38.)

modify the

t0 extend the order’s duration:

Defendant has provided no direct authority showing that the Court lacks
jurisdiction

to

extend the

NCO

in

this

modiﬁcation allowed in Rule 46.2 only
However, the pain language 0f Rule 46.2
asserting that a

case.

Defendant asserts that the

relates t0 the “substance”
is

NCO cannot have an indeﬁnite end date.

Idaho 769, 772, 229 P.3d 374, 377 (2010). Accordingly,
in this case,

(Id.,

p.39.) After

it

will

ﬁnding

See State
if the

is

correct in

Cobler, 148

v.

NCO

is

extended

have a deﬁnite date of termination.
that

it

had the authority

t0 extend the

concluded that “[t]he decision 0f whether to modify the

An

0f the Order.

not so limited. Defendant

“evidentiary hearing

t0 determine

extended” was held 0n April 27, 2018.

(Id.)

no contact

order, the district court

NCO” was within its

discretion. (Id.)

Whether the [n0 contact order] should be

Nicholson testiﬁed, and the

state reiterated its

requests for the no contact order to be extended, and for Nicholson’s and Elizarraraz’s daughter

to

be added t0 the no contact order. (TL, p.56, L.23 — p.65, L.13.)
Apart from renewing his “jurisdiction objections,” Elizarraraz had n0 other merits—based

obj ection t0 extending the

no contact order With respect

THE COURT:
as
1

it

as

So

relates t0
it

the defense contesting the extension of the no-contact order

Is

Amber Nickelson?

relates t0 the child

my

question

is

to Nickelson:

...,

In other words, this

and Part 2 as

it

relates t0

Amber Nickelson herself.

you contesting the extension

are

a two-part request. Part

is

as

it

Amber

relates to

Nickelson?
Is that

What we

are doing here, 0r are

we just talking

about the child?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We
t0 put that

are renewing all of our jurisdiction objections,
0n the record. I’m not going t0 get into that.

That being

said,

my

However, he would

client has

like t0

no issue ever talking

have a relationship with his

t0

Amber

just

ever again.

child.

So he has no issues with the no-contact order with Amber.

.

..

(T12, p.49, Ls.4-23.)

The

district court ruled

jurisdiction,”

it

relates t0

make”

from the bench.

It

again found that “I believe that

and concluded there was “sufﬁcient good cause”

Amber Nickelson

for ten years.”

(Id.,

t0

the family courts.”

n0 contact

order,

years—on April
pp.47-48.)

(Id.,

p.70, Ls.17-23.)

which raised a “a family law question

p.70, L.23

—

p.71,

L5.) The

naming “Amber Nicholsen
26, 2028.

have

“extend the no-contact order as

The court

that needs to

district court therefore

“decline[d] t0

a pending and

the daughter a protected party, insofar as there was, “apparently,

preexisting custody order,”

I

be addressed in

entered an

amended

[sic]” as the sole protected party, to expire in ten

(Sealed EX., pp.75-76.)

Elizarraraz timely appealed.

(Limited R.,

ISSUES
Elizarraraz states the issues

I.

II.

on appeal

Did the district court
the no contact order?
Did

err

When

the district court abuse

order by

as:

its

it

determined

discretion

it

had the authority

When

it

amended

the

to extend

no contact

extending the order’s duration?

(Appellant’s brief, p.8.)

I.

The

state rephrases the issues as:

Did

the district court correctly conclude that the plain language of Rule 46.2 gave

authority to

II.

Has

modify

the

n0 contact order by extending

Elizarraraz failed t0

contact order?

show

it

the

it?

the district court abused

its

discretion

by extending the no

ARGUMENT
I.

The

District

Court Correctly Concluded That The Plain Language

Authority

A.

To Modify The N0 Contact Order BV Extending

Its

46.2

Gave

It

The

Duration

Introduction

Elizarraraz claims the plain language of Rule

authority to

He

Of Rule

modify a n0 contact order—does not allow the court

argues that “if the

there

46.2—which

word ‘modiﬁcation’ included changes

would have been n0 reason

t0

gives the district court the

modify the order’s duration.

in time to a

no contact

order, then

to expressly include ‘termination’ in the Rule’s language.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.12.)

This argument

fails.

order; extending the order,

The

rule’s plain language allows the court t0

by deﬁnition,

that the “termination” language

would

it.

B.

Standard

it.

Moreover, Elizarraraz

common-sense conclusion. The

fails to

show

district court

modify the no contact order included the authority

to

Of Review

This Court freely reviews a

an Idaho

modifying

affect this

correctly concluded that the authority t0

extend

is

modify a n0 contact

statute 0r rule.”

(citing State V. Larios,

district court

“decision [that] turns

State V. Slater, 133 Idaho 882, 888,

upon

the interpretation of

994 P.2d 625, 631

(Ct.

App. 1999)

129 Idaho 631, 633, 931 P.2d 625, 627 (1997) (reviewing the lower

court’s interpretation of I.C.R. 25(a)).

The Plain Language Of Idaho Code Section 18-920 And Rule 46.2 Allow
Court To Modify A N0 Contact Order, Which Includes Extending Its Duration

C.

Idaho Code Section 18-920 authorizes a
contact with another person” if “a person

§

N0

18-920(1).

among

how

a district court

District

“an order forbidding

charged with 0r convicted 0f” certain offenses.

contact orders are governed

other things,

(a)

is

district court to issue

A

by Idaho Criminal Rule

may “issue[], modiﬂy],

which provides,

0r terminate[]” them:

N0

Orders in Writing; Service; Form; Contents.

46.2,

I.C.

contact orders issued

pursuant t0 Idaho Code § 18—920 must be 0n the Supreme Court form found in
Appendix
and served 0n 0r signed by the defendant.
defendant, who was not

A

A

present

when

the order

was

initially issued,

may

request a hearing on the order.

This request must be ﬁled Within seven (7) days 0f service 0f the order. The court
must hold a hearing Within fourteen (14) days of the ﬁling 0f the request and must

provide notice of the hearing to the protected person and the parties. Whenever a

n0 contact order
case

is

sheriff’s

is

issued,

modiﬁed

0r terminated

by

the court, or the criminal

dismissed, the clerk must immediately give written notiﬁcation t0 the

ofﬁce in the county in which the order was originally issued for entry

into records systems.

(b)

Modiﬁcation 0r Termination

person named

in

Request of Protected Person.

at

a n0 contact order

may

A

protected

request modiﬁcation 0r termination 0f

by ﬁling a written and signed request With the clerk of the court in
which the criminal offense is ﬁled. Forms for such a request must be available
from the clerk. The court must provide for a hearing Within fourteen days 0f the
request and must provide notice of the hearing to the protected person and the
that order

parties.

(emphasis added).
This

Court

is

interpreting rules” that

38,

“not

it

constrained

itself

by

promulgated.

the

constitutional

State V.

separation

0f powers When

Montgomery, 163 Idaho 40, 44, 408 P.3d

42 (2017). Accordingly, “While the interpretation of a court rule must always begin with the

plain, ordinary

meaning of the

rule’s language

it

may be tempered by

This Court will therefore “not interpret a rule in a

“[i]nstead,

in

way

that

keeping With the Idaho Criminal Rules’

the rule’s purpose.”

would produce an absurd

aim of ‘provid[ing]

Li

result”;

for the just

determination of every criminal proceeding,

’97

the Court Will “construe the rules ‘to secure

simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and elimination of unjustiﬁable expense and

delay.”

Li

(qu0ting I.C.R. 2(a)).

The plain language 0f Rule 46.2 allows a
order.

(Id.)

A

“modiﬁcation”

is

order—by changing

expiration

0n a

date—unambiguously

court’s authority to

Nor does Rule 46.2
duration.

its

E

(1 1th ed.

Extending the duration of a no

2019).

expiration date, 0r entering an

falls

modify an existing n0 contact

a “change to something; an alteration or amendment.”

MODIFICATION, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
contact

district court t0

amended order

that alters the

within this deﬁnition. Section 18-920 places no limitation

modify a n0 contact order by extending

limit a court’s authority to

Rule 46.2. As such, the

its

duration.

ﬂ

LC.

§ 18-920.

modify a no contact order by extending

district court correctly

concluded

it

had “jurisdiction

its

to

extend” the no contact order. (Limited R., p.39.)

As was

the case below, Elizarraraz provides “no direct authority showing that the [district

court] lacks jurisdiction to extend” a

no contact

order.

(Id.;

ﬂ

Appellant’s brief.)

Instead,

he

maintains the inclusion of “termination” in the rule means that “modiﬁcation” cannot refer t0

changes to the duration 0f the n0 contact order. (Appellant’s
that if

argues

“modiﬁcation” includes changes t0 the duration of the order, then “both modiﬁcation and

termination

p.12.)

brief, pp.1 1-13.) Elizarraraz

would cover

the district court’s authority t0 end in time a

no contact order.”

(Id.,

Thus, the argument goes, “the term ‘modiﬁcation’ in the Rule cannot include changes in

time to a no contact order, because such an interpretation would improperly render the
‘termination’ language in the Rule surplusage.” (Id.)

This argument

fails, ﬁrst,

because

it

ﬁnds no support

in the text

of the

concludes that “the Rule cannot include changes in time to a no contact order”

10

rule.

(id.),

Elizarraraz

but, as the

pointed out, “the plain language of Rule 46.2

district court correctly

R., p.39).

Because Elizarraraz’s purported limitation

not be superimposed into

Second,

“modiﬁcation”

will

“termination.”

(1 1th ed.

be around

still

to

fails

“termination,” 0n the other hand,

LAW DICTIONARY

nowhere

not so limited” (Limited

be found in the text

to

it

should

it.

Elizarraraz

and

is

is

is

show

A

“The

that

there

is

“modiﬁcation”

act

any overlap whatsoever between
is

“change

a

t0

a

TERMINATION, BLACK’S

0f ending something.”

2019). “Modiﬁcation” therefore presupposes that the

after the change, alteration, or

something”;

modiﬁed

amendment. Termination does

not.

thing

In other

words, “‘The power t0 modify anything does not imply a power to substitute a thing entirely
different,

and

it

does not confer the power to destroy.

447 S.W.2d 906, 908 (Tex. 1969) (quoting 58

Mo. 1096, 125 S.W.2d

1

setting aside the thing to

Linn

V.

Linn, 8 So.

C.J.S.

’97

Modify

(M0. 1938) (“‘Modify’ ordinarily
be modiﬁed”); Smith

2d 187, 188

(Ala.

V.

in

Diefenbach

rejected the cheeky claim that

P.3d

at

6“

V.

is

V.

Finger Contract Supply C0.,

p. 840);

Ruth, 343

is

not used in a sense of

limit, qualify or moderate.”).

Holmberg, 26 P.3d 1186 (Ariz.
is

V.

not used in the sense of completely

1942) (“Modify ordinarily

termination’

Van Deusen

Ray, 72 N.E.2d 921, 927 (Ohio App.1947);

completely setting aside the thing t0 be modiﬁed, but t0

The court

Webb

Ct.

App. 2001) accordingly

nothing more than a ‘modiﬁcation’ to zero.” 26

1188 (quoting In re Marriage of Bennett, 193 Ca1.Rptr. 113 (Cal. App. 1983)). Echoing

California’s appellate courts, the Court of Appeals 0f Arizona cautioned against “‘blurring the

distinction[s]

between modiﬁcation, revocation, and termination,’ because ignoring the terms’

distinctions ‘interjects unnecessary ambiguity

and confusion

into

an area 0f law already fraught

With problems’ and contradicts clear legislative intent that the terms maintain their distinct

meanings.” Li (quoting In re Marriage of Beniamins, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 3 13, 318 (Cal. App. 1994).
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The Diefenbach Court concluded,

of the clear differences between the deﬁnitions of

“[i]n light

‘termination’ and ‘modiﬁcation’ and our duty t0 interpret [statutory language] in accordance with

its

we

ordinary meaning

agree With the reasoning in Marriage ofBenjamins and conclude that

the terms are not synonymous.”

Li

Because “modiﬁcation” and “termination” are not synonyms they comfortably coexist in
Rule 46.2. “Modiﬁcation”
or shortening

its

refers t0

changes that the n0 contact order survives (such as extending

length), While “termination” refers to the destruction

0f the order. There

n0

is

surplus language here.

Finally,

sense there

is

even

if this

Court accepts Elizarraraz’s premise—that in some strained academic

overlap between shortening an order and terminating it—his conclusion

still

does

not follow. Here the district court extended the order, which, by deﬁnition, has no overlap with
termination.

In other words, construing “modiﬁcation” t0 include extensions of

orders does not

make

“termination” superﬂuous.

So even

if this

no contact

Court grants Elizarraraz’s

incorrect premise his conclusion does not follow.

Elizarraraz argues that his proposed construction should be adopted because, under

Montgomegy, 163 Idaho

at 44,

(Appellant’s brief, p.13.)

He

t0 extend

408 P.3d

at 42,

it

389 (2008).)

result.”

claims his interpretation avoids absurdity because allowing courts

n0 contact orders Will impermissibly lead

existence.”

“would not produce an absurd

to the creation

0f orders with “eternal

(Appellant’s brief, p.14 (quoting State V. Castro, 145 Idaho 173, 175, 177 P.3d 387,

This concern misses the mark.

The Idaho Supreme Court has only forbidden no

contact orders that last indeﬁnitely—those lacking “a termination date.”

176, 177 P.3d at 390; State V. Cobler, 148 Idaho 769, 772,

12

w,

145 Idaho

229 P.3d 374, 377 (2010).

at

An

extension with a termination date, like the
sense of the word, nor would

it

Violate

This brings up a larger point.
contact time

amended order

M

0r

m.

here, is not “perpetual” in

Li.

Elizarraraz has never claimed that the total

here—around 15 years—is

objectionable.

any familiar

(E Appellant’s

brief.)

amount of n0

Put differently,

Elizarraraz has never claimed (nor could he) that the district court could not have simply entered

a single 15-year n0 contact order from the beginning. In

fact, the initial

order could have been 50

years long. Because a 50-year (0r longer) no contact order has a termination date, a lengthy order

in the ﬁrst instance

P.3d

at

and

m.

145 Idaho

177

at 176,

390; 148 Idaho at 772, 229 P.3d at 377.

With

would

w

would invariably be proper under

that in

mind,

this is

Why

Elizarraraz’s approach

incentivize courts to enter the longest-possible

would lead

no contact

orders.

t0 absurd results:

If the district court

know Whether

has one chance to set a time limit—and, ex ante, does not

it

only

the defendant Will

continue t0 pose a danger to the protected party—it would obviously encourage the court t0 play

it

safe

and

set the longest possible order.

A

50-year order could always be terminated

at the

the judge’s hands; there

would

Victim’s request, if things improve. But a 10-year order

be no

way

t0 extend

it

if things

worsened.

would

tie

Elizarraraz’s interpretation

would

therefore greatly

encourage lengthy orders and would discourage short ones, regardless 0f the facts of any given
case.

So, beyond departing from the text and hobbling district court discretion, Elizarraraz’s

interpretation

would lead

benchmark 0f

t0

“‘simplicity

an absurd, defendant-penalizing
in

procedure,

fairness

in

result.

This gets nowhere near the

administration

and

elimination

of

unjustiﬁable expense and delay.” Montgomegy, 163 Idaho at 44, 408 P.3d at 42 (quoting I.C.R.

2(a))-

13

By
situation

contrast, if a

between the defendant and the protected

years.

party, courts will enter shorter orders,

narrowly

That was precisely What happened below. The 2013 no contact order lasted

tailored t0 the facts.

ﬁve

n0 contact order can be shortened 0r extended depending 0n the ongoing

(R., p.76.)

The

state

ordered a ten-year extension.

requested a “lifetime” extension but the district court only

(TL, p.57, Ls.2-9; p.75, Ls.13-23.)

It

did so because

it

knew

the

order could possibly be “extended again” (among other things), depending 0n Elizarraraz’s

behavior going forward:
[A]s [the n0 contact order] relates to [Nickelson], again, I’m going to limit it for
ten years. That is not t0 say that it couldn’t be extended again. But, frankly, I
think that

it

probably won’t need t0 be extended again because

if the

defendant

can’t comply, and if he can’t avoid further criminal activity and prosecution, there
[are]

all

kinds 0f domestic courts and further domestic Violence—no-contact

And

orders and domestic Violence protection orders.

there’s a

Whole

lot

of

options available in the law t0 Ms. Nickelson.

(1d,,

p.75, Ls.13-23.)

The plain language 0f Rule 46.2 allows a
order

by extending

its

Applying

duration.

district court t0

modify an existing n0 contact

language will lead to “simplicity in

this plain

procedure, fairness in administration and elimination 0f unjustiﬁable expense and delay.”

Montgomegy, 163 Idaho
correctly found

it

at 44,

408 P.3d

was well within

its

at

42 (quoting I.C.R.

authority to extend the

2(a)).

The

district court therefore

no contact

order.

Discretion

BV Extending The No

II.

Elizarraraz Fails

T0 Show The

District

Court Abused

Its

Contact Order

“The decision Whether
district court.”

abused

its

to

modify a n0 contact order

Cobler, 148 Idaho at 771, 229 P.3d at 376.

is

within the sound discretion of the

T0 determine Whether

a district court

discretion this Court looks to “(1) whether the court correctly perceived that the issue

14

was one 0f

Whether the court acted Within the outer boundaries of

discretion; (2)

and consistently with the legal standards applicable
Whether

it

reached

its

decision

by an

its

t0 the speciﬁc choices available to

discretion

it;

and

(3)

exercise of reason.” Li.

Elizarraraz simply duplicates his ﬁrst claim here, arguing that the district court abused

discretion

16.)

text

by extending

This claim

fails as

the

no contact order without lawful

demonstrated above. The

of the statute and rule authorized

it

authority.

n0 contact

Elizarraraz does not argue that the district court abused

(E Appellant’s brief, pp.

1

5-16.)

Nor would such

clear that, other than the jurisdictional claim, he

Amber.” (TL, p.49, Ls.16-23.) Moreover, the
fears for her safety

(Appellant’s brief, pp.15-

district court correctly

t0 extend the

its

concluded that the plain

order. (Limited R., pp.38—39.)

its

discretion for any other reason.

a claim be preserved; below Elizarraraz

made

had “no issues With the no-contact order With

facts detailed

above amply justiﬁed the Victim’s

and concerns about ﬁthher contact from Elizarraraz, and supported the court’s

decision t0 extend the n0 contact order for ten additional years. Because Elizarraraz has n0 other

claim that the

district court erred

an extension was justiﬁed—he

by extending

fails t0

show

the

no contact order—and because the

the district court abused

its

facts

show

discretion.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Contact Order

Court afﬁrm the Order Re: Jurisdiction t0 Modify

& Vacating Hearing, and afﬁrm the Amended No Contact Order.

DATED this

14th day of August, 2019.

/s/

Kale D. Gans

KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
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N0

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 14th day of August, 2019, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by means 0f iCourt
I

File

and Serve:

BEN P. McGREEVY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/

Kale D. Gans

KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General

KDG/dd
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